In this paper, an attack-resilient estimation algorithm is developed for linear discrete-time stochastic systems with inequality constraints on the actuator attacks and states. The proposed algorithm consists of optimal estimation and information aggregation. The optimal estimation provides minimum-variance unbiased (MVU) estimates, and then they are projected onto the constrained space in the information aggregation step. It is shown that the estimation errors and their covariances from the proposed algorithm are less than those from the unconstrained algorithm. Moreover, we proved that the state estimation errors of the proposed estimation algorithm are practically exponentially stable. A simulation on mobile robots demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm compared to an existing algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) have been of paramount importance in power systems, critical infrastructures, transportation networks and industrial control systems for many decades [1] . Recent cases of CPS attacks have clearly illustrated the vulnerability of CPS and raised awareness of the security challenges in these systems. These include attacks on large-scale systems, such as the StuxNet virus attack on an industrial supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system [2] , German steel mill cyber attack [3] , and attacks on modern vehicles [4] , [5] .
Literature review. Traditionally, cyber-attack detection has been studied by monitoring the cyber-space misbehavior [6] . With the emergence of CPS, it becomes vitally important to monitor the physical misbehavior as well, because the attacks on CPS always have an impact on physical system. Model-based detection has been intensively studied in recent years. Attack detection has been formulated as an`0/`• optimization problem, which is non-deterministic polynomialtime hard (NP-hard) in [7] , [8] , [9] . A convex relaxation has been studied in [7] , [9] . On top of this, the worst case estimation error has been analysed in [9] . A residual-based detector has been designed for power systems against false data injection attacks, and the impact of attacks has been analyzed in [10] . Linear algebraic conditions, as well as graph-theoretic conditions for detectability and identifiability have been provided in [11] . A switching mode resilient detection and estimation framework for GPS spoofing attacks has been studied in [12] . A multi-rate controller to detect zero-dynamic attacks has been designed in [13] . While most of the detection techniques were passive, some papers have studied active detection [14] , [15] , where the control input is watermarked with a pre-designed scheme that sacrifices optimality. The attack detection problem has been formulated as a simultaneous estimation problem of the state and the unknown input in [16] . The approach has been extended to nonlinear systems in [17] , constrained systems in [18] , and stochastic random set methods in [19] . The aforementioned detection algorithms rely on stochastic thresholds. For accurate detection, a smaller covariance is desired.
To reduce the covariance, the current paper focuses on information aggregation. In particular, we consider inequality state constraints and input constraints. There is a rich literature on Kalman filter with constraints [20] , [21] , [22] . We refer to [23] for more details for constrained filtering. Unknown input estimation algorithm with input constraints is introduced in [18] . This paper considers both inequality state and input constraints for unknown input estimation.
Contribution. We design an attack-resilient estimation algorithm given inequality constraints on the states and the attacks. The proposed algorithm consists of actuator attack estimation and state estimation. For each step, we design an optimal linear estimator without considering the constraints and then project the estimates onto the constrained space. We prove that the projection reduces the estimation error, as well as the error covariance. The practical exponential stability of the estimation error is proved formally. A numerical simulation on mobile robots shows the performance of the proposed attack-resilient estimation algorithm. The proofs of the lemmas and theorems are omitted due to the page limit. The complete version of the current paper can be found in [24] .
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section discusses some preliminary knowledge including notations, motivation, and problem statement.
A. Notations
The following notations are adopted: We use the subscript k of x k to denote the time index; R n denotes the ndimensional Euclidean space; R n⇥m denotes the set of all n ⇥ m real matrices; A > A 1 , A † , diag(A), tr(A) and rk(A) denote the transpose, inverse, Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse, diagonal, trace and rank of matrix A, respectively; I denotes the identity matrix with an appropriate dimension; k · k denotes the standard Euclidean norm for vector or an induced matrix norm; E[ · ] denotes the expectation operator. For a symmetric matrix S, S > 0 and S 0 indicates that S is positive definite and positive semi-definite, respectively. For a vector a, (a)(i) = a(i) denotes the i th element in the vector a. Finally a,â,ã , a â denote the true value, estimate and estimation error of a.
B. Motivation
1) c 2 test for detection: In attack detection for stochastic systems, the c 2 test is widely used [15] , [25] .
Given a fixed attack input v 6 = 0 and attack input estimatê v 6 = 0, a smaller covariance induces a larger normalized test valuev > S 1 vv , which decreases false negative rates. To reduce the covariance, the minimum variance estimation method is being considered intensively [26] , [27] , [28] . The current paper pursues an optimal filter design technique.
2) Constraints: It has been shown that constraints can be used to further reduce the covariance in optimal filtering; i.e., state constraints in Kalman filter (KF) [22] , [23] , and input constraints in input and state estimation (ISE) [18] . We consider linear filtering with both input and state constraints to reduce false negative rates in attack detection and to achieve accurate state estimation. The constraints are induced by unmodeled dynamics and operational processes. Some of these examples include vision-aided inertial navigation [29] , target tracking [30] and power systems [18] , [31] .
C. Problem Statement
Consider the linear time-varying discrete-time stochastic system 1 :
where x k 2 R n , u k 2 R m , d k 2 R p and y k 2 R l are the state, the known input, the unknown actuator attack and sensor measurement, respectively. Noises w k and v k are assumed to be independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables with zero means and covariances Q k ,
, v k is also uncorrelated with the initial state x 0 and process noise w k . We assume that rk(C k G k 1 ) = p as in [32] , [33] .
In the cyber-space, digital attack signals could be unconstrained, but their impact on the physical world is restricted by physical and operational constraints. Any physical constraints and ability limitations on states and actuator attacks are presented by known inequality constraints:
We assume that the feasible sets of the constraints A k d k  b k and B k x k  c k are non-empty. The vectors b k and c k , matrices A k , B k , A k , B k ,C k and G k are known and bounded. The estimator design problem, addressed in this paper, can be stated as: Given a linear discrete-time stochastic system (1) with constraints on the input and state (2), design an attack-resilient and stable filtering algorithm that simultaneously estimates the system state and the actuator attack.
III. ALGORITHM DESIGN
In this section, we design an attack-resilient estimation algorithm with inequality constraints. The algorithm design is motivated by unknown input estimation [32] , [33] , [34] , and a projection method for inequality constraint [18] , [23] . We design an estimation algorithm as in [32] , [33] , [34] without considering the constraint, then project the estimates using inequality constraints as in [18] , [23] . 
A. Algorithm Statement
The proposed algorithm can be summarized as follows: 1) Prediction:x
2) Actuator attack estimation:
4) Measurement update:
x k|k = argmin
Given the previous state estimatex k 1|k 1 , the defender can predict the current statex k|k 1 under the assumption that the unknown actuator attack is absent (i.e., d k 1 = 0) in (3) . The estimation of the unconstrained actuator attack d u k 1 can be obtained by observing the difference between the predicted output C kxk|k 1 and the measured output y k in (4), and M k is the filter gain that is chosen to minimize the input error covariances P d,u k . Then, we apply the constraints on the unconstrained actuator attack estimate in (5) and obtain the constrained actuator attack estimationd k 1 . The state predictionx k|k 1 can be updated incorporating the actuator Algorithm 1 Attack-resilient Estimation with State and Input Constraint: attack estimated u k in (6) . In (7), the output y k is used to correct the current state estimate as in KF, where L k is the filter gain that is chosen to minimize the state error covariance P x,u k . The state constraints are applied in (8) to obtain the constrained state estimationx k|k . The algorithm is summarized in Fig. 1 and presented in Algorithm 1.
B. Algorithm Derivation 1) Prediction: Given the previous state estimatex k 1|k 1 , the current state can be predicted by (3) . Its error covariance matrix is
> k|k ] is the state estimation error covariance. 2) Actuator attack estimation: The actuator attack estimator in (4) utilizes the difference between the measured output
The error covariance matrix can be found by
k 1 ) > , under the assumption that g d k 1 (Ā k 1 d k 1 b k 1 ) = 0 in (10). The cross error covariance matrix of the state estimate and the actuator attack estimate is
3) Time update: Given the actuator attack estimated u k 1 , the state predictionx k|k 1 can be updated as in (6) . We can derive the error covariance matrix ofx ? k|k as
4) Measurement update:
In this step, the measurement y k is used to update the propagated estimatex ? k|k as shown in (7) . The covariance matrix of the state estimation error is
The gain matrix L k is chosen by minimizing the trace norm of P x,u k : min L k tr(P x,u k ). The solution of the program is given by
. Now we apply the constraint in (2) to the state estimatê x u k|k . We formalize the state estimation with the constraints as the constrained convex optimization problem:
where W x k = (P x,u k ) 1 for the smallest error covariance. We denote byB k andc k the rows of B k and the elements of c k corresponding to the active constraints of (11) . Using the active constraints, we reformulate the problem (11) aŝ
The solution of the above problem is given bŷ
Under the assumption that g x k (B k x k c k ) = 0 holds, the state estimation error covariance matrix can be expressed as P
In Section IV-A, we show that the projection induced by inequality constraints improves attack-resilient estimation and detection by decreasing the state estimation error and false negative rates. However, the projection induces a biased estimate as well [18] . In this context, we will seek to prove practical exponential stability, as shown in Section IV-B. All the proofs of the lemmas and theorems can be found in [24] .
A. Performance Improvement through Constraints
The projection reduces the estimation errors and the covariance, as formulated in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.1: We have kx k|k k  kx u k|k k and kd k k  kd u k k; P k  P u k , and P d k  P d,u k . Strict inequality holds if rk(B k ) 6 = 0, and rk(Ā k ) 6 = 0, respectively.
The properties in Theorem 4.1 are desired for accurate estimation as well as attack detection. In particular, if the size of attack is smaller than the statistical threshold, the c 2 detector cannot distinguish the attack from the noise. Given d k 6 = 0, the covariance reduction implies the threshold reduction:
where the test value d > k (P d k ) 1 d k may reject the null hypothesis, while d > k (P d,u k ) 1 d k cannot. Moreover, the estimation error reduction implies an accurate test value:
k k, which further reduces false negative rates.
B. Stability Analysis
Although the projection reduces the estimation errors and the covariance as shown in Theorem 4.1, it trades the unbiased estimation off according to Proposition 6 in [18] . This is because we can guaranteeB k x k c k instead of B k x k =c k , but the unconstrained estimatex u k|k is projected ontoB k x k =c k . In the absence of the projection, Algorithm 1 reduces to the algorithm in [33] , which is unbiased.
It is essential to construct an update lawx k|k fromx k 1|k 1 to analyze stability of the estimation error. However, the construction is not straight forward comparing to that in filtering with equality constraints [18] , [20] or filtering without constraints [33] , [36] . Especially, sinceB k x k c k , it is difficult to find the exact relation betweenx k|k andx u k|k :
To address this issue, we first decompose the estimation errorx k|k into two orthogonal spaces
and then, we apply the following lemmas to each term. Lemma 4.1: It holds that (I g x kB k )x k|k = (I g x kB k )x u k|k . Lemma 4.2: It holds that g x kB kxk|k = a k g x kB kx u k|k , where a k = diag (a 1 k , ·· · , a n k ) and a i k , (g x kB kxk )(i)((g x kB kx u k )(i)) † 2 [0, 1) for i = 1, ·· · , n.
According to Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, the errors in the space I g x kB k remain identical after the projection, while the errors in the space g x kB k reduce through the projection. By Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, (12) becomes
where G k , (I g x kB k ) + a k g x kB k . Note that a k is an unknown matrix and thus cannot be used for the algorithm. We use it only for analytical purposes. Now under the following assumptions, we present the stability of Algorithm 1.
Assumption 4.1: It holds that rk(B) < n. There existā, c y ,ḡ,m,q,b ,b > 0, such that the following holds for all k 0: kA k k ā, kC k k c y , kG k k ḡ, kM k k m, Q k q I. It is assumed that rk(B) < n; i.e., the number of the state constrains are less than the number of state variables. The rest of Assumption 4.1 is widely used in literature on extended KF [37] and nonlinear ISE [17] . 
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
We simulate a scenario shown in Fig. 2 , where a two-agent system that has state and input constraints gets attacked and moves to the attacker's desired place. 
A. Single Agent Model
We consider a double integrator dynamic model for each agent i 2 {1, ·· · , n}, where n denotes the number of agents in the system. In this simulation, the subscript (i) is used to represent the agent i's vector/matrix; e.g., x (i) k and A (i) k denote the state and the system matrix of agent i. Its discrete time state vector x (i) k that considers planar position and velocity at time step k, is given by
where r (i)
x,k , r (i) y,k denote x, y position coordinates and v (i)
x,k , v (i) y,k denote velocity coordinates. The actuator attack in this simulation is constrained by the acceleration limit, and the state is constrained due to the speed limit and required minimum distance between the two agents:
x,k | 100 or |r
where (n) denotes the n th element in the vector.
Each model is discretized into the following matrices with sampling time of 0.1 seconds: 
B. Multi-agent System Model
The multi-agent system of n agents, where n 2 N, can be written in the form of system (1), where A k and C k are diagonal matrices as follows: diag(A k ) = (A (1) , ·· · , A (i) ), diag(C k ) = (C (1) k , ·· · ,C (i) k ); B k = G k , [B (1) , ·· · , B (i) ] > . The state vector, input vector, actuator attack and sensor measurement are denoted by
k ] > and y k , [y (1) k , ·· · , y (i) k ] > , respectively.
C. Attack Scenario
We consider the scenario that the attacker injects the identical actuator attack to the both agents so that they move horizontally to the right at same time. The unknown actuator attacks are Figures 3 and 4 show a comparison of the actuator attack and state estimation with and without the constraints. When the actuator attack estimate and the state estimate are projected to the constrained space, the constrained estimations have smaller estimation error and smaller error covariance as expected.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper studies attack-resilient estimation algorithm for time-varying stochastic systems given inequality constraints on the states and actuator attacks. We formally prove that estimation errors and their covariances are less than those from unconstrained algorithms, which is a desired condition for attack detection in stochastic systems. We prove that the estimation errors are practically exponentially stable. A simulation is presented to reveal the attack-resilient property and efficiency of the proposed algorithm in attack detection.
